Abstract-Models of conflict in networks provide insights into applications ranging from epidemiology to guerilla warfare. Barabási, Albert, and Jeong modeled selective attacks on networks in which an attacker targets high-order nodes to destroy connectivity; Nagaraja and Anderson extended this to iterated attacks where the attacker and defender take turns removing and rebuilding nodes and edges according to given strategies. We extend the iterative model by introducing the cost required to perform network operations. This gives a much finer granularity than previous models, whether we are interested in network resilience against random failures or intentional attacks. We empirically study how to design more effective attacks and/or defenses through intensive simulation on several well-known network topologies, including the three real-world networks. In particular, an effective defense against many attacks is to add new links connecting low-centrality nodes to maintain the overall balance of network centrality.
I. Introduction

M
ANY IMPORTANT phenomena depend on networks, from social interactions between people to explicit networks such as the Internet and supply chains. Recent advances in the theory of networks have provided us with mathematical and computational tools to understand them better [1] , [2] . Often the topology of a network has distinctive features, such as vertex order distribution, clustering and characteristic path lengths, which can be explained in terms of its evolution and which in turn explain some aspects of its behavior. For example, networks that grow by preferential attachment may acquire a power-law distribution of vertex order that in turn makes them robust against random node failures-yet this distribution also makes them vulnerable to attacks targeted on high-degree nodes. Insights like this can inform activities from epidemiology to policing. Doctors may first vaccinate those individuals who are likely to come into contact with most others, while police forces tackle criminal gangs by placing the most highly connected criminals under arrest or surveillance.
They also apply to technological networks such as the Internet, the electrical power grid, and transportation networks; these are also robust to random failures but vulnerable to targeted attacks [3] .
Network failure models are not limited to the one-shot case. When an attack occurs, a defender tries to minimize the damage by deploying new resources, while the attacker may then follow through by causing further damage. In other words, we need to consider dynamic interaction between an attacker and a defender over multiple periods. Nagaraja and Anderson [4] developed a framework to explore iterated attack and defense operations: an attacker removes k a nodes from a network at each attack round, and a defender adds k d nodes to the network at each defense round. The attacker's aim is to decrease network connectivity or efficiency, which can be measured as the size of the largest connected component or the average shortest path length in the network, while the defender's aim is the opposite [4] . This models how a network will likely evolve under continuous attack, based on evolutionary game theory [5] . It enables us to investigate what sort of attack and defense strategies might prevail in counterrevolutionary warfare: a conflict in which peacekeepers identify and arrest rebel ring leaders, while the rebels constantly recruit and reorganize themselves. However, Nagaraja and Anderson's [4] work has two limitations.
1) It does not model the costs of creating new nodes and edges realistically, as the defender is allowed to create a fixed number of new nodes at each round plus an arbitrary number of edges. In practice the cost of establishing edges is not zero, so it would be preferable to enable the defender to allocate his budget to nodes and edges with some fixed marginal cost of substitution. 2) Their experimental results were limited to a single scenario, namely a Barabási-Albert scale-free network consisting of 400 nodes with most of the experiments involving k a = k d = 10 and a few dozen rounds. We extend their work into a more generalized model; while Nagaraja and Anderson simply assumed a newly recruited node could form the right number of new connections to pursue any given defense strategy, we vary the budgets to limit newly added nodes and their connections. We note that to make a network highly robust against node removal attacks, a simple strategy is just to increase its network density. In this paper, we seek to answer a simple question: "how much does a connection cost?" We want a quantitative understanding of the correlation between network density and resilience to random failures or attacks as well as insight into the evolution of networks by iterative growth and shrinkage processes.
We therefore empirically analyze the effects of attack/defense strategies with more realistic budgets on wellknown network topologies: two Erd" os-Rényi random graphs, two Barabási-Albert scale free networks [6] , two Chord networks [7] , two Hypergrid graphs [8] , a Transit-Stub graph [9] , a Watts-Strogatz small world network [10] , a Content-Addressable network [11] , a PRU network [12] , and the three real-world networks [13] - [15] .
Our experimental results show that the strategy of connecting low centrality nodes produces the best overall performance for maintaining network connectivity for a given budget. Also, even simple defense strategies (e.g., adding nodes and their connections randomly) can be effective enough to fight against sophisticated attacks (e.g., removing nodes with high centrality in high priority) if we can increase the number of connections per node past a certain threshold.
II. Related Work
Albert et al. [3] showed that attacks targeted on high-degree nodes in scale-free networks are much more effective than random attacks; the size of the largest connected component is rapidly reduced. This is because scale-free networks get much of their connectivity from few nodes of high degree. It is hard to remove enough of those hub nodes in a random attack, but if they are targeted deliberately, then connectivity decreases dramatically. Holme et al. [16] got similar experimental results by doing such attacks on edges, and also suggested using centrality as an alternative to degree for targeting. Zhao et al. [17] studied the circumstances under which a scale-free network suffers cascading breakdown caused by the successive failures of hub nodes. Nagaraja and Anderson [4] extended this by introducing a framework from evolutionary game theory to explore the effectiveness of iterated attack and defense operations. They showed that a defender can make a network resilient to attacks by replacing highly connected nodes with cliquessmall groups of vertices that are fully connected to each other and which share the outgoing edges that previously went to a single highly connected node. This strategy, however, requires the modification of the existing connections in a network and may have high implementation costs if adding an extra edge is expensive. Clique-based defense strategies are likely to be nontrivial in some environments such as wired networks.
Recently, Domingo-Ferrer has been extending Nagaraja and Anderson's model to weighted and directed networks [18] . He also found that the costs of attacks/defenses were not clearly defined in [4] and discussed the economic aspects of the attack and defense strategies by considering the cost of node destruction/replenishment. However, it is hard to evaluate the usefulness of the estimated cost functions; as already noted, the cost of rewiring edges is usually not zero. We therefore set out to refine the iterated attack/defense model to take account of the cost of edges added or changed as well as the number of nodes added during the defense phase. We also extended the modeling to a much larger range of graph topologies.
III. Model
Our framework can formally be represented as a game on a graph G by iterating attack and defense operations for a certain number of rounds. Here, an attacker's objective is to maximize disruption to the network while a defender tries to minimize it.
Each round consists of an attack phase followed by a defense phase. In an attack phase, an attacker picks the existing k a nodes from the graph G according to her attack strategy and then removes the selected nodes and their associated edges. In a defense phase, a defender creates k d new nodes and then adds them by sequentially connecting a new node v with m edges to m different nodes already present in G according to his strategy. Unlike Nagaraja and Anderson's model, we do not allow the defender to rewire the existing edges in the graph G-this may be expensive compared to establishing new edges in some real environments such as wired networks since an edge rewiring operation can actually be treated as a combination of destroying existing edges and establishing new edges. We assume that the defender has no knowledge of which nodes and their connections are disappeared (otherwise the best strategy may be to restore the last status of the network when k a = k d ).
In order to measure the effectiveness of attacks and defenses, we use the size of the largest connected component after a certain number of rounds as the metric, as other authors in this field have done.
A. Attack Strategies
An attack strategy is a strategy (an algorithm) to select k a nodes to be removed from a graph G = (V, E) in an attack phase. We here assume k a is a constant. We consider the following three strategies. 1) Random removal: Pick a node randomly from G and remove it and its associated edges. Repeat this process k a times. a) This strategy is very simple and efficient: An attacker does not need any knowledge of the network topology. The total running time is O(d(G)) if we ignore the cost of random selection where d(G) is the average node degree in the graph G. 2) High-degree removal: Pick the highest degree node from G and remove it and its associated edges. Repeat this process k a times. a) This strategy requires global knowledge of the node degree. The total running time is O(|V | log |V |) since the nodes are sorted in decreasing order with respect to their degree. 3) High-centrality removal: Pick the highest-betweenness centrality node from G and remove it and its associated edges. Repeat this process k a times. Here, we only consider betweenness centrality since this is known to be more related to network connectivity than closeness or eigenvector centrality. Betweenness centrality b(u) is calculated for a node u as the proportion of shortest paths between all node pairs in the network that pass
where σ s,t is the total number of shortest paths from source node s to destination node t, and σ s,t (u) is the number of shortest paths from source node s to destination node t which actually pass through node u. a) This strategy requires knowledge of the network topology and has total running time O(|V | · |E| + |V | log |V |) (the nodes are sorted in decreasing order with respect to their betweenness centrality which can be computed in O(|V | · |E|) time [19] .) We use A random , A degree , and A central to denote random removal, high-degree removal, and high-centrality removal attack strategies, respectively. We note that all of these attack strategies remove the same number of k a nodes at every round if the remaining nodes of the graph G is greater than or equal to k a .
B. Defense Strategies
A defense strategy is a strategy (algorithm) to connect k d newly recruited nodes to the existing nodes in a graph G = (V, E) in a defense phase. We here assume k d is a constant. A new node v is connected with m new edges to m different nodes. We consider the following three strategies. it to G such that the node is connected with m new edges to m different nodes with probability proportional to their degree (i.e., the node is connected to an existing node u with the probability
This strategy requires knowledge of the node degree. The total running time is O(|V |) if we ignore the cost of random selection. 3) Balanced replenishment: Create a new node and add it to G such that the node is connected with m new edges to m different nodes with probability inversely proportional to their betweenness centrality (i.e., the node is connected to an existing node u with the probability
is the node u's betweenness centrality in G and is a very small constant to prevent division by zero). Repeat this process k d times.
a) This strategy requires knowledge of the network topology. The total running time is O(|V | · |E|) if we ignore the cost of random selection. Fig. 1 . Average size of the largest connected components over Erd" os-Rényi random graphs. With each pair of node size (from 300 to 1500) and average degree (from 0 to 5), we generate 100 random graphs and compute the average size of the largest connected components over these graphs. All decay rates of the largest connected component in random graphs increase dramatically
We use D random , D prefer , and D balance to denote random replenishment, preferential replenishment, and balanced replenishment defense strategies, respectively. We note that all of these defense strategies add the same numbers of k d nodes and m · k d edges at every round.
IV. The Necessary Network Density For
Robust Networks A fundamental question is whether we can make a network resilient against node failures or attacks by just increasing the number of edges. If a graph has too few edges, it is necessarily disconnected. As a network becomes better connected so its robustness will in general increase. And when providing network robustness we want to know the optimal edge budgets for newly recruited nodes.
To get an insight into this problem, we generated Erd" osRényi random graphs by varying the parameters (from 300 to 1500 for the number of nodes n and from 0 to 5 for the average node degree d(G)) and found the largest connected component in each graph. We repeated this 100 times for each tuple (n, d(G)) and computed the average size of the largest connected components over the sample. Fig. 1 
demonstrates the fraction of nodes remaining in the largest connected component with d(G).
The decay rates of the largest connected components in all Erd" os-Rényi random graphs show almost the same pattern regardless of n. The curve has a gentle slope until d(G) = 2 then plunges toward 0 when d(G) < 2. As a selective attack is at least as effective as random edge removal, we can always expect a significant number of nodes to be disconnected from the network if d(G) < 2. And when d(G) = 2, the largest connected component in G has a tendency to form a treelike graph structure which can be easily decomposable or be already reduced to a small component (see Fig. 2 ).
In Section V we will explore the relationship between the size of the largest connected component and the average degree through intensive simulation results on various network topologies.
V. Simulation Results
Because of highly nonlinear characteristics of network structures, it is very difficult to establish mathematical models with a closed form solution. So, we use the simulation model as an alternative to the theoretical model. We experimentally tested the attack and defense strategies discussed in Sections III-A and III-B on three real-world and 12 synthetic networks for evaluating the performance of the strategies as follows. [3] showed that scale-free networks are resistant to random failures but vulnerable to targeted attacks since a few hubs dominate their topology. 3) Chord networks [7] (G 
7) Content-addressable network [11] (G CA ): Contentaddressable network is designed for a distributed and scalable peer-to-peer systems. 8) PRU network [12] The network topologies are shown in Fig. 3 . We summarize the properties of the networks used in the experiments in Table I . Given a graph G, let s(G) and d(G) be the average shortest path length among all pairs of vertices and the average degree, respectively. Network diameter is the maximum distance between nodes in the network [20] . Network density is a normalized version of the average number of neighbors, which indicates the overall level of interaction between all nodes in a network [21] . For our simulations, starting with an original graph G in Fig. 3 , at each round: 1) we remove k a nodes and their adjacent edges following the attack strategy and then 2) we add k d new nodes such that each of the added nodes is connected with m new edges to m existing nodes. We set m to be the nearest integer rounded from w·d(G) where w is the edge construction weight. These parameters are summarized in Table II . The aim of the experiments is to evaluate feasibility and usefulness of each strategy and to find the optimal parameter values (e.g., w) of each strategy at the same time.
With fixed k a , k d , and m, we can observe how the size of the largest connected component and the average degree in a graph evolve. In this paper, our research interest is finding the best attack and defense strategies with varying k a , k d , and w rather than observing how network connectivity evolves in a particular network with fixed k a , k d , and w. Even if an attacker finds the ideal attack strategy for a given budget k a , a defender may block this attack even with a naive defense strategy if she can increase k d and/or w without limit. In this context, an attacker's goal should be interpreted to find an attack strategy maximizing the defense costs (k d and/or w) while the defender wishes to find a defense strategy minimizing them.
With the edge construction weight w ranging from 0.5 to 1.5, we first discuss the effects of w for each of the fifteen graphs in Fig. 3 . To demonstrate this we fix k a = k d = 10 Table III On the other hand, A random is not effective from the attacker's point of view; the size of the largest connected component remained unchanged and the average degree is still greater than 2 after 100 rounds if any defense strategy is used with w = 1.0. This is natural enough; the damage done by random failures is not essentially greater than the level of repair by random replenishment. So network connectivity will be maintained well on most popular network topologies under random node failure or removal if the same number of new nodes can be continuously recruited.
To maintain network connectivity, a possible approach is to increase network density. In our experiments, the half of network topologies with a high network density ≥ 0.009 (G 0.01 Table I ) is resilient against any attack strategies when D balance is used with w = 0.5 only (see Figs. 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 15 Fig. 13(c) ]. This is because a small number of nodes connect different clusters in G TS . Since these nodes have high betweenness centrality, transit-stub graphs are inherently very vulnerable to A central . Unfortunately, D balance cannot change this weakness of transit-stub graphs since nodes newly recruited in the defense phase generally play a role as new gateway nodes by connecting separated clusters. This trend can be observed in Fig. 20 .
and G AIR -see
Another interesting observation is the relationship between the size of the largest connected component and the average degree in a graph. As we discussed in Section IV, in all experiments, we can see that the size of the largest connected component is not maintained well when the average degree of the network falls below 2, regardless of defense strategy, but the opposite is not true [see the counter example in Fig. 13(c) ]. 
Finally, we discuss how the performance of attack and defense strategies may change when k a = k d . As k d increases, network connectivity between nodes will increase over rounds. Figs. 21 (against high-degree node attacks) and 22 (against betweenness centrality attacks) show the effects of varying k d from 7 to 13 with k a = 10 and w = 1.0. To demonstrate this we plot the size of the largest connected component in a graph at the 50th round. 
As k d increases, so does the size of the largest connected component. This is natural enough, and is particularly clear in low density networks (G 
VI. Conclusion
Barabási, Albert, and Jeong showed that, while smallworld networks were resilient against random node failure, they were very vulnerable to targeted attacks. Nagaraja and Anderson extended this single-shot analysis to the dynamic case so that attack and defense strategies could be measured against each other. We extended their work to a wide range of network topologies, including some real-world networks, and to account for the costs of replacing edges as well as nodes. In summary, we have the following.
1) The best defense strategy in general is balanced replenishment, D balance . For high density networks with network density ≥ 0.009, it is enough to set w = 0.5.
2) The best attack strategy in general targets vertex order or betweenness centrality, that is A degree or A central , in the sense that it maximizes the cost of defense. However, when the network has a hierarchical tree-like structure, it will often be better to use A central . 3) It is necessary but not sufficient for the defender to maintain the average node degree ≥ 2 to maintain connectivity. 4) A real-world network may be very vulnerable to A degree or A central even if the network has grown continuously up with new nodes and connections over time. In future work, we plan to develop better models of the adversary. We may consider not only an adversary with global knowledge of network topology but also a weaker adversary with limited information (e.g., a local police force). For example, we expect that D random is secure against any adversary with no knowledge of the network topology at all; what strategies suffice against an attacker whose knowledge is is local? Also, while adding more edges to a network may be a viable strategy for a disease pathogen, it may not help an insurgent group as a better-connected network may be more vulnerable to insider threats.
As an extension to this paper, we plan to consider a theoretical study to formally generalize and verify our results. We will also employ more advanced centrality metrics such as bridging centrality [22] to improve the performance of strategies.
